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INTRODUCTION 
Morality, understood as the underlying beliefs and values that guide 
our choices, permeates our personal and professional lives. The Jepson 
School places a great deal of emphasis on moral leadership, for the 
importance of leading with a core set of values is discussed in nearly every 
class. Via my Jepson School experience, I have become sensitive to the 
issues surrounding the ethical decision-making process, and believe that 
this area is worthy of study. As a student leader, I have been faced with 
many situations that required moral or ethical decisions. As I hopefully 
join the legal profession, the need for moral decisions will most likely 
become even greater. 
An interesting aspect of the legal profession is the judiciary, which 
often relies on a multitude_ of rules and precedents. Many believe that 
judges cannot always speatate themselves from their moral values, while 
others feel that this is·· necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
In many situations, having the legal right to do or decide something can be 
quite different from the morally or ethically "right" act. Therefore, the 
major issue to be addressed in this project is that of morality and its role 
in the judicial decision-making process. I will examine what experts 
believe is the proper role for morality in the courtroom, as well as whether 
or not judges are moral leaders. 
American society has become increasingly entrenched in litigation. 
Subsquently, the perception of increased litigation has placed the legal 
profession under an immense amount of scrutiny. The ongoing debate 
about the role of morals in the courtroom, which this project will address. 
is particularly relevant because so many court decisions affect our daily 
lives. A detailed examination of the issues of morality and the role of 
morals m the courtroom is important, for it will enable us to better 
comprehend the dilemmas that many judges face as well as clarify what 
many believe is the proper place for morals. As leaders, judges make 
decisions that we are required to follow, so examining the impact of moral 
values on this form of leadership will provide insight into why and how 
judges act in many situations. Hopefully, this project will uncover many of 
the complexities that judges face in terms of morality and moral decision� 
making. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
IS MORALITY RELEVANT IN THE JUDICIARY? 
Judges have played an increasingly vital role in American society. 
With the proliferation of litigation, judges on all levels are beginning to 
affect thousands of Americans' personal lives each day. Events such as the 
Senate confirmation hearings that focused on abortion during the 
nominations of Judges Haynsworth, Jr., Carswell, and Bork as well as 
impeachment proceedings to remove federal judges have piqued interest 
in judicial conduct.1 Some experts argue that the Senate inquiries about 
the intellectual qualifications of Supreme Court nominees David Souter and 
Clarence Thomas were about little else than abortion.2 This increased 
focus on moral issues has raised several challenging questions about the 
type of role that judges should fulfill. 
Perhaps one of the most intriguing, albeit controversial, issues 
concerns judges and their role as moral leaders. Many would dispute the 
notion that judges are, in fact, leaders, and would say that morality has 
little or nothing to do wjth a judge's role as arbitrator. To some, the 
judiciary lacks the moral competence to promote a vision of American 
moral aspirations.3 Stil1, others would contend that morals should and 
must be incorporated into judicial deliberations, and that judges have, in 
fact, become moral leaders of our nation. The courtroom, according to 
some, is the only place in the community where moral law is laid down, for 
entities such as churches, clubs, and families have failed to instill a strong 
moral code into the citizenry.4 Regardless of the view that one supports, it 
is difficult to dispute that judges must balance the detachment inherent in 
their offices with the values that permeate their personal Iives.s
One view of this topic is that judges are not and cannot be moral 
leaders. Morality, then, under this view, should have very little to do with 
judicial decision-making. When deliberating a case, some scholars believe 
that judges should mainly consider facts, laws, and precedents. as well as 
the influence of the judge's individual character.6 From this perspective, a 
judge, unlike a leader, should not be expected to lead by "the pull of 
inspiring va1ues".7 Judges are seen as an exception, for the relevant 
aspects of a judge's character does not include morality. An intuitive sense 
of fairness, an understanding of the real world, and the capacity to 
continue learning are seen as the important aspects of a judge's character.8
The courtroom and judges' chambers are viewed as forums in which 
neutrality and fairness are superior to values and morals. 
According to some legal scholars. law and morality, as separate 
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entities, must be considered in exclusion to one another, for laws are not 
always or necessarily moral.9 Since laws do not, by definition or fact, 
conform to the existing community morality, judges should refrain from 
imposing their values on the decision�making process. Therefore, judicial 
interpretation of laws cannot be a moral exercise. 
The perspective that the Constitution is the major guiding force of 
values to our nation would perhaps lead one to believe that judges, as 
interpreters of this document, are moral leaders. This view, some argue, is 
a skewed misrepresentation of reality. to Although the Constitution is the 
framework of our national government and guarantor of fundamental 
liberties, it has little to say about the values that should be most important 
to us as individuals and as a community. Debate about this issue, 
according to this viewpoint, must be grounded in legal sources and legal 
analysis. The Constitution was not intended to become a moral guide, so 
those responsible for interpreting and applying it should not serve as 
national "guidance counselors".l 1 
Proponents of the view that judges are not moral leaders would 
argue that judges are not selected or appointed because of their eminence 
as philosophers or their insights as moralists. On the contrary, they are 
selected by their potential ability to render decisions that society can 
recognize as straightforward interpretations of a constitutional or statutory 
text. I 2 The role of judges, then, is to determine the principles incorporated 
into the Constitution and apply them to concrete individua1 cases, while 
avoiding an evaluation of the wisdom or value of the policies at issue. 13 
Who, if not the judiciary, is responsible for instilling a sense of values 
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in the citizenry? Some may argue that the legislature, elected to create 
laws to lead society, are the major players. Others contend that the "soul 
of American life" lies in the law-free spaces, where social life is left to the 
regulation of norms other than those of state-guaranteed law. I 4 
Consequently, churches, families, and communities should function as our 
moral leaders. If the judiciary were responsible for defining social values, 
this role rightfully reserved for the intermediary institutions listed above 
would be undermined. I 5 In sum, many would contend that judges are not 
moral leaders because their decision-making process and the laws that 
they evaluate are not moral in nature, the Constitution which they 
interpret is not a moral document, judges were not selected to serve as 
moral leaders, and the role of moral leader should be fulfilled by other non 
governmental entities. 
Although many believe that moral leadership has no place in the 
judiciary, there is an alernative perspective on this issue. Research based 
on the alternate perspective reveals several insights: morality and law are 
not always possible to separate; professional expectations of the judiciary 
can send mixed messages concerning the relationship between judges and 
their values; and there is a great deal of controversy among legal experts 
surrounding the topic. Despite the previously discussed views that 
morality has no place in the judiciary, I believe that the above reasons are 
sufficient grounds to construct an argument promoting the view that 
morality and morals do, indeed, play a significant role in the judiciary. 
Morality and law, as some would argue, are not always distinct from 
one another, for there are myriad circumstances in which individuals may 
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choose to disobey the law on moral grounds. The law often demands 
socially-acceptable "moral" behavior, and disobeying such laws brings 
morality and law into direct contact. I 6 Problems arise with the 
subjectivity of morality, for different spiritual, ethnic, and racial groups 
could have widely divergent morals. In some cases, scholars argue that 
when a law violates a moral right, the citizen has a moral right to disobey 
the law as such. 1 7 Such occurrences could lead to legal struggles, which 
could easily necessitate a judicial decision. In cases such as these, it would 
be nearly impossible to separate a judge's moral views from the decision­
making process of the case. 
Both the personal and professional expectations placed on judges 
constitute another dimension of this debate. In order to remain impartial 
and avoid the appearance of impropriety, judges are expected to maintain 
a certain distance between themselves and the practicing bar as well as 
personal contacts. ts There exists a great expectation for judges to be 
impartial, to not incorporate their personal values in decision-making, and 
to practice "blind" justice through merely evaluating the facts and 
precedents involved in each case. However, potential Supreme Court 
justices are sometimes asked about their position on the moral/religious/ 
ethical issue of abortion. I 9 This type of questioning creates a paradox, for 
judges are expected to separate their morals from their decisions, yet are 
asked about their personal moral beliefs on volatile issues. 
Some scholars have acknowledged this discrepancy, while others do 
not believe that such a discrepancy exists. This controversy serves as 
another issue worthy of analysis. Some experts believe that there appears 
6 
to be a widely-shared expectation that judges will sometimes rely on 
personal moral knowledge.20 In fact� some argue that morals, especially 
religious faith. cannot be "shrugged off like an unattractive article of 
clothing. "21 Some would go further in suggesting that "occasional reliance 
by judges on religious convictions is not improper", and that reliance by 
judges on their personal religious convictions is as proper as reliance on 
their personal moral convictions of any other kind.22 According to some 
experts, whether or not we live in a nation in which judges are frequently 
expected to rely on moral knowledge in reaching their decisions is 
debatable23. This is a fundamental reason why this topic should be 
addressed, 
What is the role of morality in relationship to the bench? Morality, 
according to many, goes "hand-in-hand ft with the judiciary. Historically,
there has been a focus on holding judges accountable for moral behavior. 
In 1924, the American Bar Association created the original Canons of 
Judicial Ethics. The Canons were intended to be a guide of behavior rather 
than an enforceable set of rules, and were criticized for their emphasis on 
"moral posturing". Therefore, in 1972 the ABA created its Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct. This Code is designed to be enforceable, and has been 
adopted by nearly every state and the District of Columbia. Montana, 
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin remain as non-code states, and have adopted 
their own rules of conduct that are similar to the Code.24
In general, the Code provides that judges should uphold the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary, should avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities, and should perform the 
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duties of their office impartially and diligently.25 However, there is not a 
single mention of the word "moral" in the Code, and there are not 
standards that punish judges for "immoral" acts.26 The Code focuses on 
concepts such as integrity, expediency, and impartiallity. In terms of 
enforcement, permanent state agencies charged with investigating 
allegations of judicial misconduct hold hearings to make findings of fact 
and recommend or order sanctions when violations of the code are 
found27, 
For those who argue that morality should not and does not play a 
role in the judiciary, this system would seem to be an adequate mechanism 
through which to monitor illegal or improper actions. There is no mention 
of morality in the regulations, and there are no punishments per se for 
immoral acts. The Code and the system designed to enforce it, however, 
can be misleading. Indeed, there have been numerous instances when 
judges have been punished for conduct found ruu to be in violation of the 
Code. In essence, these judges were reprimanded for committing acts that 
their peers felt were "wrong" for a judge to engage in. Despite the facts 
that a written rule prohibiting their actions did not exist and that they 
would be found innocent if evaluated strictly in terms of the Code, these 
individuals were penalized for performing acts that a judge technically 
could, but should not, do. Many examples illustrating this type of 
situation can be found, but only a few are necessary to communicate the 
notion that judges actually are held accountable for acts that reflect their 
moral values. 
In a California case, intemperate or offensive personal conduct that 
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did not violate the criminal law or Code nonetheless gave rise to judicial 
discipline. In Getler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, the California 
Supreme Court removed a judge from office, citing his "crude and offensive 
conduct in public places". The judge in question repeatedly had used 
vulgar language in public and had made offensive sexual gestures to 
numerous individuals. The court concluded that "the ultimate standard for 
judicial conduct must be conduct which constantly reaffirms fitness for the 
high responsibilities of judicial office. "28 To the court, conduct that was 
technically legal but morally wrong was unacceptable: "It is immaterial 
that the conduct concerned was probably lawful, albeit unjudicial, or that 
the petitioner may have perceived his offensive and harassing conduct as 
low-humored horseplay. "29 The judge in this case seemed to be held to a 
higher moral standard than the "ordinary" citizen. Therefore, it seems that 
this value placed on moral and proper conduct signals a concern for a 
certain moral level among the judiciary. 
This focus on placing judges on a higher plane than the average 
citizen was also echoed in an Ohio case. The Ohio Supreme Court 
disciplined a judge who "admitted that he, while still married to, but 
separated form, his wife, took his "girl friend" (now his second wife) with 
him, at his expense, on a trip to Majorca and two trips to Mexico, but he 
testified that they did not occupy the same room on any of the trips. "30 
The court held that it was irrelevant whether the judge's conduct was no 
different from that of an ordinary person, since "improper conduct which 
may be overlooked when committed by the ordinary person ... cannot be 
overlooked when committed by a judge. By accepting his office, a judge 
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undertakes to conduct himself in both his official and personal behavior in 
accordance with the highest standard [emphasis added] that society can 
expect. "31 By holding judges to a higher standard than the rest of society, 
we expect them to behave in a more ethical, professional, and moral 
manner. Those who espouse the notion that judges should separate 
themselves from their morals may be asking for the impossible, for we, as 
a society, expect them to be positive role models as moral citizens. It is 
both unfair and improbable to separate judges from morality, for, as is 
shown in the examples above, their conduct is united to society's views of 
morality. In addition, this practice is futile because, if we continue to insist 
on pefection of character, we are unlikely to find many exemplary 
leaders.32 Although judges do have a call to act responsible because of the 
professional position that they are in, it is unfair and illogical to hold them 
to such a high standard and then claim that morals do not play a 
significant role in a judge's professional life. 
The issues that many judges deal with also makes it essential for 
them to utilize their own sense of morals. Every case that the judiciary 
deliberates cannot always be decided on the basis of precedent and law. 
Illustrations of this are also abundant. A juvenile court judge, for example, 
may have to decide which parent is more fit to raise an abused child. The 
judge cannot rely solely on laws or precedents. Each case of this nature 
must be decided on an individual basis, and most likely will involve some 
moral decisions on behalf of the judge. In another scenario, a judge may 
have to decide under an immigration statute whether an applicant is of 
"good moral character".33 Surely, this would entail the application of moral 
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judgment. Consider the issue of reproductive freedom. Whether the judge 
claims to be enforcing the community's moral norms or updating the moral 
vision of the Founding Fathers, it is quite evident that the judge cannot 
make such decisions without relying, at least in part, on her own moral 
knowledge.34 There are simply too many issues that seem to require moral 
judgment to discount the notion that judges must lead and deliberate in a 
moral fashion. 
In difficult cases such as these, it remains the judge's duty to 
discover what the rights of the parties are, but not to invent new rights. 
When no settled rule dictates a decision, a judge should base the decision 
on both on "the morality that is embedded in the traditions of the common 
law" and his or her personal political morality. In essence, there exists a 
"pervasive interaction" between the two types of morality.35 Although the 
judge is responsible for making a decision that is consistent in the 
application of the principle relied upon3 6, morality does permeate the 
process. 
The inter-relatedness between law and morality is another reason 
why we cannot separate judges from their morals. Morality, understood as 
the beliefs and values that guide our choices, must play a part in the 
creation, interpretation, and enforcement of laws. Contrary to the views 
discussed earlier, law can be seen as an expression of public morality 
because a variety of those involved in its creation, interpretation, and 
enforcement are somewhat influenced by their perceptions of what is just, 
fair, and true.3 7 Judges, as part of this process, cannot completely disown 
their own sense of values and morals, for it is this sense of "right and 
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wrong" that p.layed a major role in the formation of the issues that the 
court must deliberate. In a sense, not utilizing one's sense of values would 
run contrary to the process that had carried the issue at hand to the 
judiciary. Especially when involved with controversial political decisions, 
judges do and must rest their judgments on arguments of principle, not 
strictly policy or precedent.3 8 
In addition to incorporating their values into decisions, one could 
argue that the judiciary, especially the federal branch, is in a unique 
position to serve as moral leaders. Due to its political insularity, the 
federal judiciary has the institutional advantage that affords it the capacity 
to engage in the pursuit of political-moral knowledge in a relatively 
disinterested manner.39 Political-moral knowledge can be seen as a search 
for answers to the various questions as to how we should live.40 Although 
somewhat less true for other levels of the judiciary; this concept could still 
be applied because of the separation from many segments of society that is 
expected from all judges. This is not to suggest that judges can or should 
be moral "prophets" or that other branches of government aren't capable 
of effective moral leadership. However, the judiciary, due to its isolation 
and political insularity (on the federal level), is institutionally advantaged 
in dealing with controversial moral issues, for they are not concerned with 
re-election, political agendas, or answering to voters.41
Another institutional advantage that allows the courts to engage in 
moral discourse is the fact that the courts, unlike the legislative and 
executive branches, are concerned with the specific issues of an actual 
case. This tends to lengthen everyone's view, which is conducive to 
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"thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of principle." Due to 
these advantages, a judge is better able to rely (at least somewhat) on her 
own beliefs when deciding cases: 
An advantage that the courts have is that questions of principle never 
carry the same aspect for them as they did for the legislature or the 
executive. Statutes, after all, deal typically with abstract or dimly 
forseen problems. The courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an 
actual case. This tends to modify, perhaps lengthen, everyone's view .. .it is 
conducive ... to thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of 
· · I "42pnnctp e .... 
The nature of the Constitution is another factor that justifies the 
position that judges must use personal judgment and values when 
adjudicating a case. The major question in settling this issue is whether we 
have a Constitution of detail or of principle. The answer is relatively 
straightforward: "ordinary legal interpretation supports the principled 
rather than the detailed understanding of the Constitution. "43 Those who 
favor a detailed interpretation, and who advocate the stance that the 
Constitution is anything but a moral document, argue that a detailed view 
leaves state legislatures free to act in many ways unrestricted by the 
federal government (as intended by the framers when they wrote the Bill 
of Rights). Consquently, a judge must merely pay attention to the legal 
arguments while ignoring the political ones. These scholars would also say 
that a utilization of the principled view ignores legal arguments and relies 
only on personal or political ones (such as Justice Blackmun's decision in 
Roe v. Wade )44. However, this argument is flawed, for a constitution of 
principle is "a precondition [emphasis in original] of legitimate democracy" 
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for a government required to treat individual citizens as equals, and to 
respect their fundamental liberties and dignity. Unless these conditions 
are met, there can be no genuine democracy, for without them the 
majority would have no legitimate moral title to govern45. A judge, then, 
must utilize his or her morals when interpreting the Constitution. Of 
course, there must be limits on a judge's power to interpret the 
Constitution according to his or her own convictions: judges must justify 
their decisions through arguments of principle and integrity, which the 
legal profession can criticize, and which the public, (who elect judges or 
whose influence should be felt by those who nominate judges) can sensibly 
assess.46 
As previously discussed, judges may be held to higher professional 
and personal standards than the average citizen. However, a factor that 
one cannot discount is the influence of a judge's subconscious on his or her 
decision-making. Some experts claim that the influence of the 
subconscious necessitates that a judge will, perhaps unknowingly, utilize 
personal values. Indeed, "deep below the conscious are other forces, the 
likes and the dislikes, the predilections and prejudices, the complex of 
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, 
whether he be litigant or judge. "4 7 Perhaps judges cannot be fairly 
expected to separate themselves from the rest of society, for "the great 
tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their 
course, and pass the judges by. ".4 8 The ideal of completely separating 
oneself from the case at hand "is beyond the reach of human facilities to 
attain" .49 One of the nation's great leaders would agree with the belief that 
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such objectivity is impossible, for, as President Roosevelt told Congress rn 
1908: "The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions 
depend upon their [judges] economic and social philosophy. ",50 Indeed, it 
would be futile to try to "overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of 
these subconscious loyalties ... for never will these loyalties be utterly 
distinguished while human nature is what it is'1.5 I The inability to 
completely subdue these forces of individualism will not hinder the 
judicial process. for "the eccentricities of judges balance one another; ... out 
of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a 
constancy and uniformity and average value greater than its component 
elements. ft ,52 Put rather simply, one should not even consider whether or 
not a judge should incorporate personal morals into decision-making, 
Judges cannot neglect their values, for human nature makes this 
impossible. 
ARE JUDGES MORAL LEADERS? 
Through this discourse about how judges are involved in moral 
decision-making, one can extend this notion to state that judges are moral 
leaders. The definition of a leader is quite elusive, but there are several 
characterstics that a judge exemplifies that many would equate to 
leadership. A leader guides his or her followers, and utilizes knowledge 
and expertise to make decisions for the benefit of her constituents. Judges, 
through their decisions, share this trait of a leader. However, the 
comparison goes a step further. A moral leader also serves as a role model 
to the followers, and should always act according to a core set of values. 
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As previously discussed, judges are placed on a higher moral level than the 
rest of society; thus, they can be seen as moral role models. 
Like leaders, judges will not be able to lead without credibility. They 
are in possession of two sources of credibility: the status of their office 
and the way in which they adjudicate justice. Concerning the latter 
category, a judge must function with honesty and integrity. Honesty was 
the most highly selected leadership characteristic chosen in a study 
conducted from 1987-1995 that utilized surveys to identify desirable 
leadership traits. "Moral-neutral" characteristics such as being fair-
minded, intelligent, straightforward, and mature were not ranked any 
where near honesty. The resarchers found that people want ethical, 
principled, honest leaders who maintain a high sense of integrity. 
Although judges were not specifically targeted in the study, the fact that 
.. nearly 90% of constituents want their leaders to be honest above all else 
is a message that all leaders must take to heart." .s 3 
Another finding was that "we simply don't trust people who won't 
tell us their values, ethics, and standards. H .54 This seems to communicate 
the idea that judges are actually expected to be moral leaders by most of 
society. Additionally, because judges are held strictly accountable for their 
actions, they must consistently operate from their own core set of values if 
they are to initiate and structure a national discussion on fundamental 
values and morality.55 Indeed. for most involved in legal education, law is 
seen as intertwined with moral philosophy, and court adjudication is the 
preferred vehicle for molding American character.56 Judges obviously play 
a pivotal role in this process. 
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As moral leaders, judges must balance the needs of their followers 
with the fair administration of justice. The combination of these two 
concerns, when applied to the judiciary, create an image that the courts are 
a leader in areas such as social reform and civil liberties.5 7 The decisions of 
the courts, especially at the federal level, help shape the way that we live 
and teach us what is socially acceptable behavior. Cases such as Roe v. 
Wade and Brown v. Board of Education are specific examples of when the 
Court led the nation in new and different directions. Although these cases 
lacked moral declarations, they nonetheless told the nation that it was time 
to make a significant change. 
Mora1ity and its relationship to the judiciary has been a topic of 
intense discussion in and out of the legal profession. While many believe 
that judges are merely arbitrators of justice, others argue that judges are 
integral moral leaders of our society. This author agrees with the concept 
that judges are moral leaders, for they are held to a higher moral standard 
compared to the rest of society, constantly deliberate moral issues, are a 
part of the inter-relatedness of law and morality, and are in an 
institutionally advantaged position to contend with moral dilemmas. In 
addition, the principled nature of our Constitution as well as characteristics 
associated with human nature would qualify judges as moral leaders. 
One cannot expect judges to completely divorce their morals from 
their cognitive processes. Judges should not abuse their power to enforce 
their morals on society. However, they have an obligation as moral leaders 
to incorporate their sense of values (along with knowledge of facts, 
precedents, and law) when making decisions. Judges must consider legal 
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creating a track of legal courses centered around ethics and morality. 
Most law schools do not extensivley 'involve their students with these 
topics, and some claim that this may be a part of the reason why many 
lawyers are subject to scrutiny for immoral or unethical practices. In 
addition, I plan to submit an article based on this project to The Journal of 
l&rukrshio Studies. This article will be unique due to the facts that it 
addresses such a controversial topic and that it will be written by those 
involved in the field of leadership studies. Presently, most of the 
literature in the Journal is submitted by fields other than Jeadership, and 
this article will exhibit the fact that the Jepson School is committed to 
confronting difficult leadership issues. 
PROJECT RESULTS 
RESULTS _FRQM_Tiffi__EQRUM. JNTERYlE_WS. AND COURT OBSERVATIONS 
Through active engagement with nine experts in the fields of law and 
ethics, certain attitudes and beliefs were discovered that validate many of 
the findings discussed in the literature review. Personal and phone 
interviews were conducted with su of the experts, two sessions of one 
expert's court were completed, and the forum, titled "Leadership from the 
Bench: Are Morals Irrelevant?" exhibited the views of five experts59. The 
primary (but not only) issues addressed during these activities were: 1) 
whether or not judges are, indeed, leaders; 2) the role of morals in the 
judicial decision-making process; 3) whether or not judges are moral 
leaders; and 4) whether or not personal conduct has an impact on a judge's 
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professional responsibilities. It should be noted that each interviewee and 
panelist did not necessarily answer all of the same questions. Therefore, 
some questions have more responses than others. Again, the purpose of 
this phase of the project was to confirm or refute the arguments put forth 
in the literature review. 
Each expert agreed that judges were leaders, but fe1t that they lead 
in different ways. One interviewee did not classify judges as leaders in 
general, but conceded that they do lead m the procedural aspects and 
administration of justice. Another noted that judges are not leaders in the 
tradtional sense, in that they do not have a followership who follow them 
on a purely voluntary basis. For this individual, the important role that 
judges play in terms of leadership is when one must make decisions where 
there are gaps in the law. Two days of observation of the Richmond 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (presided over by one of the judges 
studied) provided many examples that validate this claim. On numerous 
occasions, the judge was required to decide what sanctions were "fair" 
sanctions in terms of spousal abuse, what would be "proper" visitation 
rights, and what would be *in the best interest" of many children. Void of 
precedent or clearly defined statutes, the judge had to "fill in the gaps" and 
make a 
decision for the best interests of those involved. Although it was only 
possible to view two sessions of this court, the examples nonetheless 
support the claim made earlier that judges cannot always neglect their 
morals. In fact, during instances such as those just mentioned, moral 
values can be a pivotal guiding influence on a judge's discretionary power, 
and can work in conjuction legal guidelines. 
20 
The remamrng seven respondents agreed that judges are leaders, but 
m varying degrees. One respondent viewed the leadership of a judge as 
mainly that of a role model, for judges lead by example and consultation of 
other judges, while six contended that the precedents that judges set and 
the importance of their decision-making definitely qualify them as leaders. 
One made the observation that the perception of a judge's capacity for 
power and influence was vital, and places him or her on a different level 
than the rest of society. This supports the research claim that, because of a 
judge's potential for power and status, a judge is held to a higher standard 
than the rest of society. In sum, all agreed that judges functioned as 
leaders in some capacity, but did not agree with the specific type of 
leadership that judges exhibit. 
Perhaps the most intriguing issue addressed was the role of mo r a Is 
in the courtroom, as we1I as the judge's duty of separating his or her 
morals from those of society. According to one respondent, judges share 
central moral values (such as the belief that murder is morally wrong) 
with the rest of society. This expert did not see that the morals of the two 
entities would usually conflict, but contended that it is the judge's 
responsibility to resist public pressure if the citizenry presses for a hasty 
decision based solely on emotions. In rare cases where the judge 1s not 
guided by the morals of society, he must structure the decision so that 
morals will be analytically separated from the legal question. An 
important finding was that every expert agreed that judges cannot 
completely separate their morals from the decision-making process. Five 
went beyond the view that morals cannot be separated from a judge's role 
as leader in contending that morals should not be separated. 
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A judge's responsibility, according to three interviewees, 1s to 
interpret laws as consistently as possible in relation to one's personal value 
system. If a situation arises where a judge is in danger of being unfairly 
biased because of certain moral values, then it is his or her responsibility 
to recuse him or herself from the case. It seems that these experts would 
agree with Justice Cardozo's view that human nature and other 
subconscious forces would make complete objectivity an impossibility. One 
interviewee argued that judges cannot ignore their role as moral leaders, 
and that a judge must 1) educate herself about different moral viewpoints, 
2) consult with others, and 3) lead by example in order to lead effectively.
In essence, a judge should acknowledge, not ignore, moral views, for 
morality is not merely a subject of leadership. Rather, it is the 
underpinnings of every subject of leadership. Six of the respondents 
agreed with this view that a judge must be aware of his or her 
subjectivity. A judge must acknowledge, rather than ignore, personal 
views so that he or she can effectively manage them. Ethics and morals 
are fundamental to justice, so a judge simply cannot neglect the 
importance of these concepts. Again, this finding supports the claim that 
judges should not be expected to divorce themselves from their morals, for 
doing so is both impractical and impossible. 
Whether or not judges are moral leaders was another major area of 
discussion. Six respondents believed that judges do serve in this capacity, 
while one viewed judges as moral role models or moral examples, and not 
moral leaders. In this expert's view, judges must not outwardly express 
their moral views, and the role of moral leadership belongs primarily to 
religious and political leaders. The other six respondents held a decidedly 
opposite view, for they believe that judges act as moral leaders via their 
opinions, behavior, precedents set, and the manner in which they conduct 
court proceedings. Two interviwees held a similar position in stating that 
judges are often responsible for making decisions that are not congruent 
with popular opinion. In cases such as these, a strong sense of moral 
convictions will inevitably lie behind legal interpretation. However, if a 
judge fails to acknowledge a law that supports something that he or she 
does not believe in (i.e.. the death penalty), he or she must work within the 
bounds of the law and the will of the majority. While morals play a 
significant role, they are not the only influence a judge must consider. 
Even in the observed court proceedings in which the judge possessed 
a great deal of discretion, six respondents agreed that a judge stiJl faces 
several limitations; legal and statutory guidelines, the facts of the 
particular case, the integrity of the judge limiting him or herself to those 
facts, respect for the legislature (and the will of the majority it expresses), 
interpretations made by higher courts, and the utilitarian nature of court 
decisions. If a judge cannot abide by the laws of the land strictly due to a 
certain belief, noted two interviewees, he or she should refuse to hear that 
particular case (or find another line of work!). These sentiments support 
the claim made earlier that a judge cannot ignore his or her morals, but 
may not be solely guided by personal values. 
A judge•s personal conduct outside of his or her professional role was 
the only area in which any of the respondents completely disagreed. 
Seven experts believed that judges have a duty to carry themselves in a 
moral and professional fashion at all times, for there exists a certain 
decorum that judges are constantly expected to maintain. Another 
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important aspect of leading a responsible private life is the perception of 
neutrality and professionalism required of judges. This view, shared by a 
majority of the respondents, supports the notion that judges, unlike 
"normal" citizens, have to live by a higher standard. On the other side of 
the spectrum, one expert held that a judge does not necessarily have to be 
a good person to be a good judge, for a judge that is considered to be a 
"rotten" person can possibly fulfill the role of judge as long as he or she 
possesses a keen sense of fairness and justice. One expert's view lies in the 
middle of the other interviewees', for he said that it takes a moral person 
to be a good judge, but the fair and efficient administration of justice is 
more important than the type of person adjudicating a given case. 
The responses discussed above concur with many of the positions 
aruged in this paper. The interviewees agreed that judges are leaders, and 
six of them believed that judges are moral leaders. In addition, all stated 
the notion that judges simply cannot completely ignore their own moral 
convictions. Lastly, all agreed that morals do, indeed, find their way into 
the courtroom. Although a judge may deal with morals in different ways, 
it is difficult to dispute the contention that morals do play a significant role 
in the adjudication of justice. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intent of this project was to explore the issues concerning the 
controversy surrounding judges, leadership, and morality. Through 
extensive research as well as enlightening exchanges of dialogue, it has 
hopefully been shown that judges are wedded to their moral values, and 
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that to deny otherwise would be to say that judges can do the impossib]e: 
separate "who they are" from what they do. The significance of objectivity 
is obviously of utmost importance, but it has hopefu11y been proven that 
judges confront constitutional and legal questions with at least some 
manifestation of their values. In addition, a strong case for the position 
that judges are moral leaders of our society has been made. Extensive 
research, along with the support of the views of various experts in the 
fields of law and ethics, has advocated this stance. 
It is hoped that forums like the one created during this project will 
continue in the future, and that various organizations wilt continue to work 
with one another in order to educate as many people as possible about 
such important issues facing the legal community and, ultimately, the 
community-at-large. The study of leadership, particularly in conjunction 
with relevant issues in the legal field, can only increase our understanding 
of how our nation functions. 
Leadership from the Bench: Are Morals Irrelevant?---Absolutely Not 
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APPENDIX B 
The following experts on law and ethics have been either 
interviewed, observed in court or during the forum, or both: 
** Loren A. Smith, Chief Judge 
United States Court of Federal Claims 








Coston Family Chair of Leadership and Ethics 
Dr. Azizah al-Hibri 
Associate Professor, T.C. Williams School of Law 
Hon. Kimberly O'Donnell, Chief Judge 
Juveni1e and Domestic Relations Court, City of Richmond 
Hon. James Spencer 
United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia 
Hon. Philip Trompeter 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, City of Roanoke 
Hon. Rosemarie Annunziata 
Court of Appeals, Commonwealth of Virginia 
Hon. Don Lemmons 
Circuit Court, City of Richmond 
Mary Sue Terry, Adjunct Professor in Political Science and Leadership 
Studies (University of Richmond) 
APPENDIX C 
** Analysis of interview content was made with permission of all 
interviewees. 
** Court observations were made on Monday, March 25, 1996 and 
Thursday, March 28, 1996 at the Richmond Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court. Chief Judge Kimberly O'Donnell presided over the 
hearings. 
** The forum, titled "Leadership from the Bench: Are Morals Irrelevant?" 
took place on Tuesday, April 9, 1996 in Jepson Hall room 1 J 8 at the 
University of Richmond. The panelists included Hon. Philip Trompeter, 
Hon. Don Lemmons, Hon. Rosemarie Annunziata, and Hon. James Spencer. 
The discussion was moderated by Mary Sue Terry. It has been videotaped 
and is available for viewing. 
The program was a collaborative effort between the Cadmus Leader­
in-Residence Program, the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, and the T.C. 
Williams School of Law. Members of the coordinating committee included 
Judge Kimberly O'Donnell, Dr. Marc Swatez (Jepson School of Leadership 
Studies), Associate Dean W. Clark Williams (T.C. Williams School of Law), 
and the author of this paper. 
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Appendix D 
The following is a copy of an article in the April I 0, 1996 edition of 
the Richmond Times-Dispatch concerning the forum that was a major 
component of this project. 
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They cite restraints 
as being necessary 
BY AUN COOPER 
TIMEs-DISPATCH STAFF WRrI'ER 
U.S. District Judge James R. Spen­
cer recalled the courtesy visits he 
paid members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 1986 when he was 
nominated for a federal judgeship. 
Every senator noticed the master 
of divinity degree on his r�swne and 
asked in some fonn or another how 
he could be deeply religious and still 
be fair and objective as a judge. 
Spencer said he was offended at 
the question at the time but has come 
to realize that it was appropriate. 
The senators were properly con­
cerned about whether his religion 
would take the fonn of starry-eyed 
mysticism or narrow-minded zealot­
ry that would override the will of the 
majority as expressed in the laws the 
senators wrote, Spencer said. 
Spencer was one of four judges on 
County gets 
funds to pay 
for daycare 
Prince William set , 
far ivelfare program 
MAAK �MUS/TIMES-DISPATCH 
QUESTION OF MORALITY. JudgN on the panel were (from left) Donald W. Lernon1, RaNmarle An1mnzlata,
Philip J. Tronapete, and James R. Spencer. Former VlrBlnla Attorney General Mary Sue Terry moderated.
a panel . that discussed "Leadership 
from the Bench: Is Morality Rele­
vant?" last night at the Jepson School 
at the University of Richmond. 
The other panelists were Virginia 
Court of Appeals Judge Rosemarie 
Annunziati., Richmond Circuit Judge 
Donald W. Lemons and Judge Philip 
J. Trompeter of the Roanoke Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District
Court. Fonner Virginia Attorney
General Mary Sue Terry moderated.
Lemons said the imposition of mo­
rality is inevitable in judging because 
there is no purely objective judge. 
The better question is where are the 
restraints on imposing that morality. 
He listed several: the facts of a 
particular case and the integrity of 
the judge in limiting himself to those 
facts, respect for the legislature and 
will of the majority it expresses, the 
binding inte11>retations of the law by 
higher courts, and the utiliti.rian na­
ture of court decisions. 
Annunziati. said those constraints 
make it difficult for a judge to fulfill 
"our common notion of a leader." 
Judges are most effective as leaders 
when they fill in gaps in the law, but 
they also are important symbols of 
how the third branch of government 
should operate, she said. 
Spencer noted that judges often 
must consider "competing values, 
both coming from the community.'' 
He cited as an example the display of 
a homoerotic painting outside an art 
gallery in Shockoe Bottom several 
years ago. Many members of the 
community were outraged by the 
painting, which he found "totally dis• 
gusting" but still concluded was pro­
tected by the First Amendment. 
"It's times like these that I thank 
God for life tenure ... which makes 





BY JIM MASON 
TIMEs-DISPATCH STAFF WRIT 
Virginia's biggest-ever caI 
to promote safe and sober r 
will be lawiched here Friday n 
an unspecffied sobriety chec 
by Richmond and Chesterfield 
ty police officers and state trc 
Attorney General James 1 
more m will join State Police 
intendent M. Wayne Huggins 
kick off the campaign. Similar 
points, teaming state and local 
are also planned Friday night i 
fax County and Norfolk. 
Made possible by a $200,0( 
era! grant, officers and troope 
also urge compliance with spe1 
its and encourage drivers and 
seat passengers to buckle up 
"Far too many motorists taJ. 
and sober driving for grante 
this is the bottom line: the 
primary elements are driving 
Teen-ager shot in hack recounts 
attack at trial of third defendan� 
BY DEBORAH KELLY 
TIMES-DISPATCH STAFF WRITER 
In a matter-of-fact voice that belied 
the terror of the event, a 15-year-old . 
boy described the night last fall when 
thtee newfound friends attacked and 
tence on convictions of robbery, us­
ing a fireann in a felony and accesso­
ry after the fact to malicious wound­
ing. 
. Wilkerson was sentenced to eight 
years on convictions of robbery and 
• r.. - � • ,... . 
The victim, whose name is 
withheld because of his age, rr 
three defendants on the night 
Sept. 29 shooting at a football 
in Chesterfield County. They v 
the youth_to3.et them marijuar 
